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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the Group of 20 (the G-20)* in the context of international
relations, especially the G-20’s impact on global governance and international security,
and the G-20’s significance for Canada and the conduct of Canadian foreign policy. It
will show that the G-20 embodies the changing way the world interacts and it will argue
that the group works and is needed, but that it can work better and become a more
important and more effective element of global management. 
At the same time, the G-20 will not itself be sufficient to govern the world and should
not be judged harshly as a consequence. The group can complement but not replace
existing international organizations, especially the United Nations, although it can
provide impetus to their work and utilize their capacity, becoming, if G-20 members are
sufficiently sagacious, a key steering group of the network of organizations, institutions,
associations and treaties by which states govern relations amongst themselves. The
paper will also argue that if, as is likely, the G-20 endures, it will change the context in
which Canada pursues its foreign policy and change, as well, how that policy is
conducted, making the institution of prime minister even more paramount in the
pursuit of Canadian interests abroad and the protection of Canadian values than it has
yet become. More than ever, the prime minister will be the face and voice, indeed the
personification, of the government of Canada on the international stage.
* Paul Heinbecker is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for International Governance
Innovation and inaugural Director of the Centre for Global Relations at Laurier
University; he is a former Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations.
OVERVIEW AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*
It is early days to draw definitive conclusions about the future of the G-20†. It has yet to
graduate fully from crisis response to agenda-setting, and from financial re-engineering to
global economic governance. Regenerating global economic growth and adopting financial
regulatory reforms to prevent a repeat of the worst economic crisis in nearly 100 years has
necessarily remained the main task for the G-20, the self-appointed premier forum for
international economic cooperation. The impact of the G-20 on the management of global
financial affairs has been positive and significant, albeit not sufficient. 
It is apparent already that the G-20 could do more, regarding both the international economy
and financial crisis and the major political and security issues of our times. Enlarging the
agenda is difficult for the group partly because the economic crisis is proving stubbornly
persistent, even if the depression wolf has been driven from the world’s door, and partly
because the group’s members are not united either on the diagnosis of what is needed to put the
global economy on a strong, sustained growth path or on what a broader agenda would entail.
Some believe, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the next G-20 host, apparently does, that
the world needs G-20 leaders to enlarge its agenda. There would potentially be value in the
G-20 addressing hybrid issues that have economic and other ramifications, such as climate
change and political/security issues, notably failing states, terrorism, UN reform, the Iranian
nuclear program, etc. 
It remains to be seen whether common ground among the world’s most powerful leaders will
expand and a shared sense of responsibility for global governance will emerge as they address
themselves to the over-arching, sometimes zero-sum problems they face. It is not impossible
that in a smaller forum (smaller, that is, than the UN), their differences deriving from different
cultures, languages, experiences and economic philosophies will just be more starkly apparent
but little or no easier to resolve. So far there has apparently been some disposition to stake out
positions in the G-20 rather than to enter into cooperative problem solving. There is a risk that
if the expected benefits of small group dynamics are too slow to materialize, the G-20 will
become more a mini-UN than a macro-G-8. In that case, both the G-20 and the world body
would be the poorer. One of the most important global governance issues the world faces is the
quality and nature of the relationship between the nascent G-20 and the sexagenarian United
Nations; both are necessary but neither is sufficient and cooperation can bring synergies. It is
very much in everyone’s interests to work constructively for a more cooperative and productive
future for both. Further, it is in Canada’s interests in particular to bend every effort to make the
G-20, which affords us extraordinary opportunities to promote and protect our interests,
successful.
* Other works by Paul Heinbecker in the same field include:“The Future of the G-20 and Its Place in
Global Governance”, Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 2011; The “New”
Multilateralism of the 21st Century” with Fen Hampson in Global Governance, a Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations, forthcoming, 2011 and The United Nations and the
G-20: Synergy or Dissonance?”, in Global Leadership in Transition: Making the G-20 More Effective and
Responsive, Colin I. Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim (eds.), Brookings and the Korea Development Institute,
Washington: Brookings Institution Press, June 2011.
† The G-20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United States and
the United Kingdom. Spain is an unofficial member and the Netherlands has attended. The EU qua EU is
represented. See the chart at the end of this paper for group memberships.
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CONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS
The G-20 and the Crisis
• The Group of 20 heads of government came into being in 2008 because economic
catastrophe loomed, preventive action and remedial steps were urgently needed, and the
existing global governance organizations and institutions were unequal to the tasks. As
well, the ground had been prepared for institutional innovation. 
• Notwithstanding sometimes warranted criticism, the G-20 countries have been successful in
averting grievous harm to the global economy including quite possibly a depression; they
have stuck tightly to their top priority of economic and financial reform.
• The G-20 countries have been largely effective in financial re-engineering to mitigate the
crisis, although more remains to be done, notably with respect to implementing Basel III
banking reforms, providing the authority and resources required by the new Financial
Stability Board (FSB) and solving the issue of financial institutions that are too big to fail;
and carrying out and strengthening the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), the backbone of
the “Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” adopted at the Pittsburgh
G-20 Summit in 2009.
• The G-20 countries have done less well so far in addressing the highly political tasks of
resolving the current account, trade and budget imbalances conundrum, whose roots go
deep into the economic and political philosophies of the world’s largest economic players,
although thanks in part to Canadian brokering progress was made by G-20 finance
ministers in Paris in February in establishing criteria by which dangerous imbalances can be
measured and assessed. 
• The larger story of the G-20, including its much criticized performance at the Seoul
summit, is not that the G-20 is failing to resolve intractable issues but that the issues are
intractable and the G-20 is working on resolving them. 
• Absent the G-20, the world might find itself in a Smoot-Hawley environment and in
depression. In any case, there is no other forum where prospects for agreement are better.
The G-20 and Global Governance
• The G-20 has not yet transformed itself from a global crisis response group to a global
steering group. Further, it still lacks consensus on the nature of what it is that ties members
together i.e., global interdependencies.
• The G-20 will not in any case itself be sufficient to govern the world. Through cooperative,
transparent relationships, it can complement existing international organizations, not replace
them.
• There would be benefits if the G-20 countries broadened their agenda to address the world’s
most pressing hybrid issues such as the economic and financial dimensions of climate
change, along with non-economic issues, including global governance reform. 
• The exclusive nature of the group promotes efficiency but limits its effectiveness in rallying
wide-scale support for its decisions. It needs the cooperation of other bodies to extend its
reach. 
• A reciprocal, quality relationship between the nascent G-20 and the sexagenarian United
Nations is necessary. Both institutions are needed, neither is sufficient and cooperation
between the two is likely to yield synergies.
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• The G-20 faces serious operational challenges deriving from diverse philosophies,
experiences, languages and cultures, as well as logistics that encumber the group’s
effectiveness. However necessary, the cooperation of 20 sovereign and powerful countries
was never going to be easy or simple to achieve.
• The G-20 will probably supplant the G-8, which might survive as a high-level dinner
meeting on the margins of other events. There will not be a G-2, and likely not a G-5, for
the same reasons that the G-8 is inadequate: the membership would be too narrow to solve
all problems on its own and insufficiently powerful to compel others’ cooperation. 
The G-20 and Security
• As most major states have too much at stake economically and socially to risk a role of the
military dice against each other, perhaps the most effective action the G-20 countries can
take to improve international security is to strengthen economic relations between them by
implementing their commitment to strong, sustainable and balanced economic growth.
• To the extent the G-20 is successful in promoting an environment of trust in which all
acquire “habits of cooperation,” there will be spillover effects into security relations,
reducing frictions between members and facilitating problem solving, as has been the case
in the past between Russia and the rest in the G-8, which could be especially beneficial for
the Asian members of the G-20 who have fewer effective organizations within which to
subsume their differences and work cooperatively.
• If the G-8 experience is any guide, the G-20 leaders will sooner rather than later start to
consider political/security issues; if they don’t, the G-20 might die of boredom! 
• To the extent that the G-20 qua G-20 will concern itself directly with security, it will likely
do so in response to phenomena such as organized crime and terrorism, although the threat
the latter poses is comparatively small (many more people died from extreme weather last
year than from terrorism cumulatively in the past 40 years).
• We are entering into a time either of enhanced cooperative governance if we are wise or
zero-sum international competition if we are foolish; the G-20 could be decisive in
determining which it is to be. 
The G-20 and Canada
• If, as is likely, the G-20 endures, it will change the context in which Canada pursues its
foreign policy and become a major locus for the promotion and protection of Canadian
interests and values.
• It will also change how Canadian foreign policy is conducted, becoming a vital avenue and
instrument for the pursuit of Canadian interests abroad and the protection of Canadian
values. 
• More than ever, the prime minister will be the “point man” of Canadian high-level
diplomacy, becoming the face and voice, indeed the personification, of the Government of
Canada on the international stage.
• The institution of prime minister will be thus even more paramount in the conduct of
Canadian foreign policy.
• Canada should make the most of its membership in the G-20, and seek to broaden its
agenda to suit Canadian interests, especially as we will not be in the UN Security Council
for some years to come.
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THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Globalization continues to change our world before our eyes and, notwithstanding the constant
repetition of bad news by today’s 24-hour news cycle, largely for the better. Since 1950, gross
world product has increased more than eightfold and average per capita income has more than
tripled. Since 1990, almost 500 million people have climbed out of poverty.1 Average life
expectancy has increased by almost 50 percent. The global literacy rate has increased from
56 percent in 1950 to 82 percent in 2004.2 Despite the predations of terrorism and the failing of
fragile states, the world remains largely at peace. According to a report of the independent UN
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2005, there were fewer interstate wars
between countries large or small in the second half of the 20th century than in the first half,
despite a nearly fourfold increase in the number of states.3 And the number of intra-state wars
declined dramatically since 1992, before increasing slightly since 2003.4 
Most countries, including most major countries, increasingly put economic prosperity at the
heart of their foreign policy. The US is a major exception, although there are signs that hard
economic times and vast deficits are forcing reconsideration there too. Further, the sheer
destructiveness of contemporary military technology, even “conventional” technology, makes
war between major states increasingly irrational and improbable, except by inadvertence or
miscalculation. Most states have too much at stake economically and socially to risk a role of
the military dice.
People in almost every region are healthier, richer, better educated, more secure and better
connected electronically—as well as more numerous—than ever before. More than two billion
people have access to the Internet, and more than five billion have access to cell phones, which
together are becoming a tool of democratization or, at least, public information and protest.5
People are more and more linked to each other and have progressively greater access to
information, as the revolution in Cairo’s Tahrir Square showed. As a consequence, governing
this world presents challenges more complex than ever before. States remain predominant in
global decision-making but technology is making it possible for more and more people to be
involved in the world beyond their borders and for more and more individuals and groups to
affect the environment in which states conduct their foreign (and national) policy. The same
phenomenon affects the operations of multilateral organizations. 
1 Sources: Compiled by Earth Policy Institute with 1950–1979 from Worldwatch Institute, Signposts 2001, cd-Rom
(Washington, DC: 2001) (Worldwatch update of Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 [Paris:
oecd, 1995]); 1980–2005 from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, at
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ weo/2006/02/data/index.htm, updated September 2006; United Nations, World
Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision (New York: 2005); U.S. Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, “Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product,” Table 1.1.9, revised August 30, 2006, at
www.bea.gov; Unesco Institute for Statistics, Data on Illiteracy, for Population Age Fifteen and Older:
http://www.uis.unesco.org; Economic and Social council E/CN.9/2010/3, January 28, 2010.
2 See the UNESCO Literacy Report 2008 http://www.uis.unesco.org/template/pdf/Literacy/LiteracyReport2008.pdf
3 See A/59/565, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, December 2, 2004, p 12.
*
4 Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of
War. Pre-publication. Vancouver: HSRP, 2010. (Forthcoming in print from Oxford University Press Brief, Figure
10.1.
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“The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power,” Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, Foreign Affairs,
November-December 2010.
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Although the US will long remain the pre-eminent state, Asian political and economic power is
growing perceptibly and the centre of economic gravity is shifting eastward, and southward.
China, though far behind the US by most economic, social and military measures, is making
rapid progress6, as are other emerging economies, with the result that in the decades ahead, no
country will determine unilaterally the course of world events. At the same time, competition
between states is at least as much economic as military in character, with the size of a state’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its attractiveness to others in terms of quality of life
increasingly a currency of power and influence. We are entering into a time either of enhanced
cooperative governance if we are wise or zero-sum international competition if we are foolish.
The G-20 could be decisive in determining which it is to be. 
The global institutions through which the world governs itself have been struggling for over a
generation to respond to the world’s rapidly changing expectations and demands. The UN, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have for some considerable time faced
challenges of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy as they have considered whether and how
to acknowledge the emergence of new powers and to accommodate growing popular
engagement. The G-8 has faced similar problems. The G-20, potentially the most important
innovation in global governance since 1976, when the G-7 was formed, or even since the
creation of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions in the 1940s, is important both for what it
is—a body whose membership is a frank acknowledgment of the power shifts underway in the
world—and for what it can potentially do to help world leaders cooperate to deliver effective
global leadership and governance, if those leaders have the wit and will to use it effectively and
creatively.
This paper will attempt to answer three key sets of questions:
• How well is the G-20 doing, and what does the future likely hold for it? Will it complement
or conflict with the G-8, the UN and other global institutions with security avocations? Is the
G-20 still necessary?
• What are the consequences of the G-20 for international politics and security likely to be?
• How will all of this affect Canada, particularly Canadian foreign policy and what should
Canada do about it?
None of these questions can be answered confidently at this time and certainly not definitively,
but thinking about them now is essential to our adapting to a world that is changing rapidly.
6 But according to Branko Milanovich in “The Haves and Have-Nots,” as quoted by Doug Sanders in the Globe and
Mail. January 22, 2011, “Even as the Chinese worker has gone from $525 per year to $5,000 in two decades, the
average American worker has gone from about $25,000 to $38,000,” the income gap has widened in favour of the
American.
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THE SHORT, LARGELY SUCCESSFUL, BUT SO FAR MOSTLY ECONOMIC, HISTORY OF
THE G-20
In international relations as in everything else, necessity is the mother of invention, timing is
everything, and opportunity comes to prepared minds. The G-20 heads of government came
into being in 2008 because economic catastrophe loomed, preventive action and remedial steps
were urgently needed and the existing world governance organizations and institutions were
unable to resolve the major financial issues that the highly innovative and equally reckless
American and European financial communities and their feckless regulators and overseers had
created in the preceding two decades. The G-20 also came into being because the ground had
been prepared for institutional innovation. 
The G-20’s Origins
The origins of the Group of 207 are traceable to the successive financial crises at last century’s
end—the Mexican peso crisis, the Asian financial contagion and the Russian default—when it
became clear that existing institutions were inadequate to meet the challenges they faced.
Then-finance minister Paul Martin and his US treasury secretary counterpart, Lawrence
Summers, among others, recognized that the G-78 of leading industrial countries was unable to
respond effectively to financial crises because the governments seated around the table were
not able to carry out or enforce the decisions they made. Crucial players, capable of resisting
G-7 decisions or ignoring them altogether, were absent. To remedy the problem, Martin called
into being the G-20 finance ministers group, which thereafter met as an entity. In Martin’s
words in 2001, “[n]obody’s going to follow a G-7 dictate. They [the emerging powers and the
faltering economies] have got to be at the table and be part of the solution.”9 Further, even
though the G-20 represented the lion’s share of global GDP, large parts of the world were not
represented and the hope was that countries like South Africa, and others, would take a
leadership role in their regions, promoting best practices and sound policies.
As the heat of that financial moment cooled so, too, did the ardour of finance ministers for
their G-20—possibly a harbinger of things to come for prime ministers as the “Western
Financial Crisis” subsides. The G-20 finance ministers, as an institution, nevertheless endured,
and engaged in meaningful debate in a frank, informal manner, seeking consensus, building
habits of cooperation and creating personal relationships that were ready to be called on when
the time came to do so. When Martin subsequently became prime minister in 2003, he
perceived before many other leaders did the rapidity with which power realities in the world
were changing. To respond to the times, he called for upgrading the G-20 to the level of
leaders, and he also commissioned Canadian think tanks, notably the Centre for International
Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo and the Centre for Global Studies at the University
of Victoria, in cooperation with Brookings, Princeton, Oxford and others, to research the
modalities of such an upgrade. In 2005 he wrote that “an effective new [leaders’] group,
focused on practical issues of global importance, is something that the world very much
needs.”10
7 For an interesting and detailed assessment of North-South relations, see Global Governance and Emerging
Economies—An Indian Perspective, by Shyam Saran, former Indian foreign secretary and national security adviser
of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 2010.
8 The US, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Japan and Canada.
9 Interview with Paul Martin, Canada’s Minister of Finance and Chair of the G-20 conducted by Candida Tamar
Paltiel, G-8 Research Group November 18, 2001, Ottawa.
10 Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, A Global Answer to Global Problems, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005.
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It was an innovative idea whose time had not quite come, however, meeting inertia and even
resistance in several G-8 capitals and above all in Washington where president George W. Bush
was simply not interested in participating in one more multilateral summit group where US
power and freedom to maneuver would be constrained by combinations of others less
powerful. Further, most G-8 members were comfortable in their small, familiar, like-minded
group, where they could talk relatively freely with one another. Further, the prestige and thus
domestic partisan political advantage that such exclusivity appeared to confer were also
factors; better to be seen in the intimate company of the instantly recognizable (by the public)
powerful Western leaders than that of the less médiatique arrivistes, to be a big fish in a
smaller pond. They preferred to enlarge their group informally, inviting other leaders, and
heads of international organizations, to join the proceedings only on issues for which their
presence could not be avoided. Various formulations were used, e.g., G-8 + others and G-8 +
G-5, all of which had the G-8 as the core.
At the same time, the emerging powers, especially China and Brazil, but also India and
Mexico, did not relish the idea of being “outreach” countries and were increasingly chafing at
G-8 expectations that they should be satisfied to wait in the corridors for a summons to join the
top table for figurative dessert—and to share the tab for dinner. As their global significance
grew rapidly, their impatience with attending G-8 sessions only on the sufferance of their
“betters” grew apace. They formed their own counter-group, the G-5, a divisive development
that was likely to complicate global problem-solving rather than facilitate it. When
subsequently the G-20 leaders came into being, the five agreed among themselves that they
would not acquiesce in an organic link between the G-8 and G-20 processes11 (a decision that
was to cost Canada a pretty penny when summits had to be organized in Toronto as well as
Muskoka). The G-20 was to be new, one of the few international bodies in which the major
existing powers and the major emerging powers were to meet on the basis of formal equality,
unlike the UN Security Council with its permanent and non-permanent members or the major
international financial institutions, where voting power is weighted. Nor were caucuses of the
eight and five to become the norm within the G-20, although the G-8 qua G-8 has continued to
meet separately.
As the financial system rapidly melted down in the fall of 2008, and as G-8 leaders, especially
those in Washington, peered into the economic abyss, all reticence about including the
emerging powers in their midst evaporated. The G-5, for its part, welcomed the idea of being
part of something that was not an appendage of the G-8. All eagerly grasped the ready-made
idea of the G-20, and president Bush, apparently at the urging of President Sarkozy of France,
convened the group in Washington to try to chart a course away from the precipice. Thus was
born the leaders’ G-20, a made-in-Canada idea, and foreign policy success, albeit not because
of any enthusiasm for it in Conservative-governed Ottawa after Martin left office. The G-8 was
at least initially Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s preferred grouping.
11 See “Global Governance and Emerging Economies” by Shyam Saran, former Indian Foreign Secretary and national
security adviser of Prime Minister Singh, 2010. 
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The G-20 Record So Far
The G-20 as an entity has been effective and has the potential to be more so, although progress
on its economic agenda has slowed as it addresses domestically sensitive problems. It has met
five times since its inception in 2008 and has succeeded in pulling the world back from the
abyss of another Great Depression, undertaking some of the financial re-engineering needed to
prevent a recurrence. The G-7 finance ministers and the G-20 leaders saved, not too strong a
word, the international financial system from collapse. 
On October 10, 2008, facing the very real risk that markets would just not open on the
following Monday and that there would be a run on British banks, with demonstration effects
elsewhere, finance ministers including Canada’s Jim Flaherty, agreed they would do whatever
it took to prevent the banks from defaulting, unfreeze credit and money markets, re-establish
lending, assure confidence in national deposit and guarantee programs and restart secondary
markets for mortgages and other securitized assets. Fortunately, it largely worked. 
At the Washington G-20 meeting a few weeks later, heads of governments signaled, Apollo 13-
like, that they recognized that the world had a problem and pledged to work cooperatively to
address it. All leaders agreed to take steps to unfreeze credit, “fix” their banks (Canada was
exempted), launch financial reforms, avoid protectionism and stimulate their economies. At the
next meeting in London in the spring, leaders undertook to pump large sums—a trillion dollars,
using creative accounting—into the international economy through the IMF and other
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), to the benefit largely of the large emerging
economies. Leaders effectively reversed the descent into economic depression, launching
reform of the international financial regulatory system, modernizing international financial
institutions and undertaking to recognize in structural terms the growing power and influence
of the emerging market countries. They created the FSB12, a potentially major international
institutional innovation, intended to provide better international oversight of the financial
system and develop capital and liquidity standards for systemically important financial
institutions. 
In Pittsburgh in the fall, as the danger of a depression receded, the leaders proclaimed the G-20
as the “primary institution for [their] economic cooperation”13 and charted the transition from
crisis to recovery with the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (FSSBG),
commissioning work on what had to be done to achieve a new “balanced” growth model in the
future. 
In Toronto the following June, Canada’s game plan was for the G-20 to concentrate on meeting
past commitments on the core agenda, and to hand off progress to Seoul. Ottawa focused the
summit agenda on four critical areas: 
• Supporting the recovery and laying the foundations for the FSSBG.
• Following through on required reforms to the regulation and management of financial
sectors.
12 Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (02/04/2009), the official communiqué issued of the G-20 London Summit.
13 Pittsburgh Communiqué.
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• Strengthening international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF,
through reforms to their governance and strengthening of their resources.
• Resisting protectionism and seeking enhanced liberalization of trade and investment.14
Leaders found themselves having to respond to the suddenly urgent sovereign debt crisis in
Europe triggered by Greece. Prime Minister Harper, who had earlier written to other leaders
about deficits, proposed precise targets for winding them down. With his counterparts from
Britain, Germany and France, he favoured sending the markets a signal of fiscal consolidation,
i.e., that leaders understood that they needed to rein in unsustainable deficits and public debt in
advanced economies, although they also recognized that such consolidation had to be balanced
against the continuing implementation of fiscal stimulus in some countries and a rebalancing in
global demand, with a particular emphasis on emerging economies to offset the slower growth
in the developed world.  
US President Barack Obama, for his part, worried that the recovery was not yet self-sustaining
and emphasized, therefore, leaving the door open to increased stimulus spending, the large
government deficits notwithstanding. Ultimately, G-20 leaders under Harper’s chairmanship
effectively decided to do both, agreeing that they would complete their planned fiscal stimulus
programs, but also setting targets of a 50 percent deficit reduction by 2013 and a stabilized or
improving debt-to-GDP ratio by 2016, thereby sending a clear signal to markets that they
recognized that budget deficits could not go on forever. The British had already moved to cut
spending in order to get their fiscal books in order and others promised to do so. Others,
especially the newly emerging economies, argued that they didn’t have a deficit and debt
problem and that they needed to continue to spend on development; in any case, the countries
that had caused the crisis should get their own houses in order first. The emerging economies
were effectively excused from the deal, as were the Japanese whose fiscal problems were put
in the “too difficult” category. To block a British, French and German push for an international
bank tax that would have unfairly burdened Canadian banks, which had not been part of the
problem, the Harper government actively sought allies and made common cause with some of
the emerging economies, notably China and India. 
In Toronto, leaders also made progress on the goal of financial sector reform. In particular,
leaders agreed on the need to recalibrate upwards requirements regarding the amount and
quality of capital held by banks. Leaders agreed on the importance of creating a strong
regulatory framework, including the need to create a more effective system for oversight and
intervention. Whether the major powers will heed such advice is an open question. 
In Toronto, the G-20 was also able to deliver on a number of earlier commitments, including
ensuring $350 billion in general capital increases for multilateral development banks, which
would allow them to nearly double their lending. The group also endorsed recent reforms at the
World Bank and called for an acceleration of efforts to advance additional quota and
governance reforms at the IMF to reflect changed reality. On both quotas and “voice,” leaders
recognized that the situation at the IMF, with its northern and western, especially European,
over-representation, remained inequitable, seriously undermining the legitimacy of the 
14 Len Edwards, Canadian “Sherpa”, speech to the Annual General Meeting of the Korea-Canada Society, Ottawa,
November 3, 2010.
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organization and support for it in the rest of the world. Leaders also renewed their commitment
to avoid protectionism and to conclude the Doha Development Round of trade negotiations.15
Perhaps as a consequence, protectionism has not disappeared but has arguably not been as bad
a problem as it might otherwise have been. Completing the Doha negotiations remains,
however, in the realm of good intentions. Overall, the G-20 took forward its “core” agenda,
dealt with the sovereign debt crisis, and put in train work for Seoul and beyond. 
Following Toronto, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney commented that successful
implementation of the G-20 financial reform agenda, when combined with the peer review
process of the FSB and external reviews by the IMF, should increase actual and perceived
systemic stability. At the same time, he warned that while the right promises had been made,
implementation was less encouraging.16 It was evident already then that the G-20 was
becoming a victim of its own success, having achieved enough progress to lessen the urgency
of going further, and thereby taking at least some of the drive out of the financial reform effort.
In the lead-up to Seoul, the G-20 struggled to come to grips with currency valuation and credit-
easing policies and their significance for current account and trade imbalances. The US and
others, including Canada, took one side and China and Germany took another, with the US
blaming China for currency manipulation to maintain its export-led growth, China criticizing
the US for unilaterally creating excessive credit through “quantitative easing” and some other
countries openly or covertly agreeing with one or the other or both. It is a sign of how
tendentious discussions among the group had become on monetary policy that the veteran and
very sober German politician and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble characterized US
policy as “clueless”—not the usual vocabulary used in these august circles—for, in his
judgment, pumping too much financial liquidity into the market which would destabilize some
countries’ financial systems and risk provoking international defensive responses. South
African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan warned that “developing countries, including South
Africa, would bear the brunt of the US decision to open its flood gates…” which “undermines
the spirit of multilateral co-operation that G-20 leaders […] fought so hard to maintain during
the current crisis.” Brazil’s Finance Minister, Guido Mantega, warned that the US move would
hurt Brazil and other exporters. China asked for an explanation.17
Policy responses to the imbalances were creating strange, or at least, new, bedfellows.
In Seoul, the cracks in solidarity evident in Toronto on the causes of trade and current account
imbalances and on currency values became fissures. The group effectively split several ways
on this issue, but did manage to establish a 2011 target for agreeing on “indicative guidelines”
by which to assess imbalances and to consider what, if anything, to do about them. Harper and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India were tasked with providing ideas. G-20 countries
were able to agree on the need for new financial rules to render the international financial
15 Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “From Canada to Korea: Advancing Global Leadership through the G-8 and G-20”
in G-20 the Seoul Summit, November, the G-20 Research Group Munk Centre for International Studies, University
of Toronto, 2010.
16 Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney’s speech, Sep 10, 2010.  
17 China, Germany and South Africa criticize US stimulus, BBC Business News, 5 November 2010.
11
system more resilient, reduce the “moral hazard” of major financial institutions relying on
governments to bail them out, limit the buildup of systemic risk and support stable economic
growth.18 The G-20 adopted new capital and liquidity requirements for banks that will,
however, only be implemented starting on January 1, 2013 and only fully phased in by January
1, 2019, ostensibly out of concerns for constricting lending and thereby aborting the recovery,
but likely also because of the effective lobbying by Wall Street in Washington. Priority
attention was also given to the regulation of commodity derivatives markets, which have been
blamed for commodity price volatility and the food crisis of 2008. 
The Seoul summit will likely be remembered for registering the importance of the emerging
economies in the G-20, both by virtue of its non-G-8 locus and by the shift in the content of
the agenda. Thanks mainly to Korean leadership, “development” in the sense of economic
growth, rather than the traditional donor-recipient paradigm was added to the G-20 agenda.
Seoul also put the issue of cross-border capital flows on the G-20 macro-prudential regulatory
agenda, advocating the creation of “financial safety nets” to safeguard smaller states from
volatile financial flows and obviate the need for the self-insurance of large reserves, which
contribute to the imbalances problem. 
At Seoul, G-20 leaders endorsed IMF reforms that will give developing countries greater
influence in the institution. China will become the third largest IMF shareholder, bypassing
Germany, as part of an overall six percent transfer of voting power to dynamic and
underrepresented economies. Progress in reforming the IMF has been made, but a clear and
widely shared view on the appropriate role and functioning of the IMF remains, nevertheless,
elusive. In some respects, the IMF has progressed from acquiescing in G-8, especially
American, views to acquiescing in G-20 views; progress of a sort. The willingness of the major
economies to heed the IMF remains sketchy.
THE FUTURE OF THE G-20 AND ITS PLACE IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The G-20: A Work in Progress
Because of the currency and liquidity disputes, the general public perception of the results of
Seoul was negative, even if progress was made on a number of key issues (IMF reform,
financial regulation, development, etc.). In the Spring of 2011, according to the Financial
Times, Reuters, the Globe and Mail and others, finance ministers and central bankers made
progress in reconciling the divergent views of the US, which has the world’s largest trade
deficit, with those of China and Germany, who have the two largest surpluses, on establishing
indicators of the causes of the imbalances, and in financial reform challenges remain,
especially as regards reserve currencies and capital market volatility as well as cross-border
financial institutions being too big to fail and the need to give the new FSB the authority and
capacity to do its job effectively. They, also, agreed that G-20 countries accounting for more
than five percent of G-20 GDP (on market exchange rates or purchasing power parity exchange
rates) will be reviewed, reflecting the greater potential for spillover effects from larger
economies. (Financial Times, April 2011).
18 Prime Minister Lee Myung-bak, President, Republic of Korea, in G-20 the Seoul Summit, the G-20 Research Group
Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, November 2011.
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The Washington summit communiqué foresaw “addressing other critical challenges” such as
fossil fuel subsidies, energy security and climate change, food security, rule of law, and the
fight against terrorism, poverty and disease.19 There is also a need for the international
community to address water scarcity, reform of the UN Security Council and arms control. The
G-20 has, nevertheless, stuck close to its self-prescribed economic and financial mandate. 
For everyone’s sake, G-20 leaders do have to get the economics and financial issues right, as
well as the related reforms to the governing rules and regulations. Undoubtedly, the group will
be judged primarily on its success in re-engineering the financial system to preclude as much
as possible recourse to risky financial practices that can bring the entire world to the brink of
economic disaster. But over time, and likely not very much time, G-20 leaders will probably
complement their financial and economic agenda with deliberations on other issues that require
their attention. Experience derived from the G-8 has been that when leaders come together, the
temptation is irresistible to take advantage of each other’s presence to discuss the pressing
issues of the day, whatever they are and whatever the agenda of the meeting they are attending
may be. Nor do most (perhaps not including Harper, who regards himself as an economist)
want to delve too deeply into the technical details of international finance, preferring to leave
that task to finance ministers and national bank governors.
The next G-20 summit will be held in France, and its host, Sarkozy, speaking before an annual
gathering of French ambassadors in July 2010 signaled his preference for an expansive agenda:
“… now that relative calm has returned, there is a temptation to
limit the G-20’s ambitions to implementing its decisions,
supplementing them in 2011 by expanding regulation where it
remains insufficient, verifying the implementation of tax exchange
information agreements, adopting strong measures to fight
corruption, strengthening the mandate of the Financial Stability
Board and, more broadly, re-examining the prudential framework of
banking institutions to avoid a repetition of the recent crisis.
Completing the work that is under way is important—the G-20’s
credibility depends on it. But is it enough?20
He then answered his own question, asserting that “sticking with this agenda would condemn
the G-20 to failure and the world to new crises.” It would also condemn the world to cope with
its major governance problems using organizations and institutions that were created in other
times, partly at least to address other issues.
In January 2011, Sarkozy refined his priorities for the next summit in Cannes, identifying three
overall priorities that France would invite G-20 leaders to address, namely: 
1. Continuing reform of the international monetary system to ensure that the decisions taken at
the last five G-20 summits are put into practice, particularly as regards financial regulation,
greater stability of the international monetary system, volatility in currency values, volatile
capital flows that destabilize developing economies as well as indicators to measure global
economic imbalances.  
19 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, November 15, 2008.
20 President Nicholas Sarkozy, adapted from an address to the 18th Ambassador’s Conference, 25 August 2010, Elysée
Palace, Paris.
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2. The need to control the volatility of commodity prices, including oil and agricultural
products, notably wheat (commodities of particular interest to Canada, especially to
Western Canada), possibly through a code of conduct on food aid and emergency stocks. 
3. Reform of global governance. 
On the last, Sarkozy’s ambitions stretch from creating a G-20 secretariat to promoting
innovative financing for development such as some version of “the Tobin tax” on international
financial transfers, giving the International Labour Organization (ILO) more weight in global
governance, setting up a minimum standard of universal social protection, fulfilling financial
commitments on climate change (the G-20 summit in France will be held just before the 2011
UN climate change conference in Durban, South Africa) and infrastructure projects in Africa.
UN reform, particularly UN Security Council reform, which had earlier been an explicit part of
the French governance reform package, appears to have been regrettably put on the back burner.
Whether and how far the other G-20 leaders will wish to accompany the French president in
pursuing such an ambitious and wide-ranging agenda remains to be seen. Progress will not in
any event come easily. Conflicting national interests lie behind all of the issues that he
enumerated, not least currency values and commodity price volatility, climate change and
international institutional reform. The group is unlikely to be a panacea for all that ails the
world, but it is potentially important.
The G-20 and the G-8: Redundant or Complementary?21
The Canadian government has been one of the principal defenders of the ongoing utility of the
G-8, with Harper arguing that the G-8 and G-20 have distinct but complementary roles to play.
He apparently sees the G-20 as focusing on finance and economics and the G-8 on democracy,
development assistance (it was at Huntsville that Harper promoted the multi-billion dollar
initiative on maternal and children’s health22) and peace and security.23
Not everyone is convinced by the logic of these divisions, especially as regards economics and
development, as China, India, Brazil and South Africa are deeply involved economically in the
Third World. Non-G-8 members of the G-20 are skeptical of the need for the continuing
existence of the G-8, even wary of it. G-8 members seem generally disposed to continue the
G-8’s existence although some, including particularly Obama, have expressed doubts. Sarkozy,
the host of the next G-8 in 2011, seems noncommittal, remarking to the gathering of French
ambassadors last summer that while France would prepare the next G-8 summit with the
requisite care, “…some have said [the G-8] is condemned. Others believe it has a rosy future if
it refocuses on security issues and its partnership with Africa. The future will decide.”24
21 For a fuller treatment of the relationship of the G-8 and the G-20, see “Canada, the G-8 and the G-20: A Canadian
Approach to Shaping Global Governance in a Shifting International Environment,” by Gordon S. Smith and Peter
Heap, SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, Volume 3, Issue 8, November 2010
22 The Canadian initiative succeeded in attracting quite substantial funding—pledges equaled $ 7.3 billion—but also
drew the ire of some of our partners, notably the Americans, for our determination to exclude funding for abortion, a
policy posture that had earlier been adopted by the Bush administration, but explicitly rejected by the Obama
administration. US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton specifically and publicly criticized this dimension of the Harper
government’s initiative. The communiqué papered over the cracks.
23 Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, at the 2010 World Economic Forum, Davos,
Switzerland, January 28, 2010. See also the article by Prime Minister Harper, in G-20 the Seoul Summit, the G-20
Research Group, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, November 2010.
24 President Nicholas Sarkozy, adapted from an address to the 18th Ambassador’s Conference, 25 August 2010, Elysée
Palace, Paris.
14
It does seem very likely that the G-8 will not in future meet in tandem with the G-20, given the
antipathy to it of the non-G-8 members of the G-20. The G-8 might well become little more
than a high-level dinner club that meets on the margins of the UN General Debate in New York
each fall, which all of its members usually attend anyway. This would keep the group alive and
allow its members to compare notes on issues of interest, and do so at vastly lower cost, not a
trivial consideration at a time of soaring budget deficits.
Ultimately the G-20 seems destined to supplant the G-8. The time demands of summit
diplomacy—exceeding a dozen gatherings per year and more for some leaders—as well as the
wear and tear on leaders of travel across time zones and the impatience of those leaders with
redundancies of forums and issues, militate in favour of dispensing with the G-8. For example,
at Huntsville and Toronto, both the G-8 and the G-20 addressed themselves to Haiti’s
problems, with the G-8 discussing Haiti’s security needs and the G-20 focusing on economic
challenges. Had there been the will to do so, some moderately agile drafting would have made
it possible to address these issues in one session. Unless the G-20 falls into deadlock, the odds
are that the G-8 will go the way of the Group of Major Emitting Countries, which has near
identical membership to the G-20, and which has not met since the L’Aquila, Italy summit in
2009.
THE G-20 AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
One of the most important governance questions facing the international community is what
the relationship is to be between the G-20 and the UN. Both are creatures of the wills of their
member states, and are in some respects complementary instruments for promoting global
governance and international cooperation, and, in other respects, potentially competitive. As
and when the G-20 enters the international political domain, it has the ability to assist the UN
to come to grips with intractable global problems, notably climate change, by importing greater
consensus into UN deliberations. It can also impart a reform trajectory to the UN that is
difficult to generate otherwise. The UN, for its part, can extend the G-20’s effectiveness,
“ratifying” G-20 decisions and thus lending greater legitimacy to them. Getting the relationship
between the G-20 and the UN right holds the prospect of considerable benefits all round.  
The Enduring Value of the UN25
The UN Charter provides the rule book for the conduct of international relations which all
states, including G-20 states, usually see it as in their interest to respect—and have respected.
If the UN didn’t exist, to quote the old cliché, the world would have to invent it, if the world
could marshal the political will to do so in the absence of a stimulus as powerful as the Second
World War. 
25 For a fuller treatment of the United Nations, see Paul Heinbecker, “Getting Back in the Game; a Foreign Policy
Playbook for Canada,” Key Porter, 2010, from which some of this line of argument is derived.
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An underappreciated reality is that the UN is a kind of motherboard of global governance,
performing its own core functions but also enabling other entities, for example, UNICEF, to
work better as well. Were there no UN with its universal membership, the restrictive G-20
would be much more controversial and its decisions much more contested—and resented.
NATO, for its part, needs the UN to certify the legitimacy of its operations in, for example,
Afghanistan and Libya, and to complement NATO’s military efforts there with civilian
development programs. The UN also makes it possible for initiatives such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) to be sub-contracted out efficiently. The reverse is also true. The
products of other entities, potentially including the G-20, are imported into the UN for
consideration by its larger membership and where possible endorsement, as the Ottawa Treaty
on anti-personnel landmines, the Responsibility to Protect and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria have been. From peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-
building to international criminal justice systems, sustainable development, refugee protection,
humanitarian coordination and food relief, democracy and electoral support, human rights
conventions, health protection, landmine removal and managerial accountability and oversight,
the organization has been innovating and equipping itself to acquit its increasingly demanding
responsibilities. As a consequence, the UN has a broader presence in the world than any other
organization except the United States, and much substantive expertise in dealing with
contemporary challenges, such as instability, fragile states and natural disasters. 
The results of the UN’s efforts are impressive—and vital. In 2009, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees protected 36 million people—equivalent to more than the population of Canada—
including refugees, the stateless, the internally displaced, returnees and asylum-seekers.26 In
2009, the World Food Program (WFP), operating in 75 countries, fed almost 102 million
people,27 which is more than three times the population of Canada. The World Health
Organization (WHO), which, in its earlier years, led the successful program to eradicate
smallpox, is now close to eliminating poliomyelitis. As a consequence of the work of the
WHO and its private partners, including Rotary International, polio infections have fallen by
99 percent since 1988, and some five million people have been spared paralysis. With the
assistance of the WHO and UNICEF, the immunization of children for the six major vaccine-
preventable diseases—pertussis, childhood tuberculosis, tetanus, polio, measles and
diphtheria—has risen dramatically. For example, about 20 percent of the world’s children had
been inoculated in 1980 for measles; the figure by the end of 2009 was an estimated
82 percent28; at least 90 percent will be immunized by 2015, the target date of the MDG.
Global coverage of infants for hepatitis B in 1990 was one percent; in 2009 it was 70 percent.29
Meanwhile, the WHO has also been coordinating the world’s response to SARS, the avian flu
and the H1N1 virus. This work has been belittled in some unenlightened quarters as mere
international social work. It is social work, but it delivers very real human and national security
benefits, which the G-20 is unequipped to deliver.
26 UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html, Table 22. Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced
persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR by region, 2008-
2009.
27 WFP Annual Report 2010
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp220666.pdf
28 Deaths from measles, a major killer, declined by 74 percent worldwide and by 89 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa
between 2000 and 2007.
29 See “Global Immunization Data”, based on the latest World Health Organization (WHO)/UNICEF global estimates
for 2009, October 2010.
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At the same time, the United Nations suffers from problems that have accumulated since 1945.
Disagreements, often grounded in genuine differences of interests, persist between the rich
northern countries and the Group of 77 (G-77), between the permanent five members of the
Security Council and the rest, between climate changers and climate victims, between Israelis
and Arabs and Muslims more generally, between Indians and Pakistanis and between North
Korea and South Korea and the US, etc. These various disputes and failures hinder the UN’s
effectiveness and, as a consequence, diminish its efficacy. 
Similarities and Differences, Complementarities and Dissonances30
The UN is an organization with a written charter endorsed by 192 countries, an extensive body
of international law and rules created under its auspices by its members, a General Assembly of
member states, a Security Council, an international court, a Secretary-General and a
professional secretariat of 63,45031, including the staff of the World Bank, the IMF and a
constellation of related organizations, councils, tribunals, commissions, funds and agencies.
Just under 100,000 soldiers and police serve under the UN flag in 15 current operations.32
Housed in an iconic building on the East River in New York, the UN disposes of a combined
annual budget of about $10 billion in contributions from its member countries (Canada pays
about 3 percent) to support its operations, a modest cost compared to the budgets of most
governments; the Canadian federal budget totals approximately $260 billion33.
The UN’s legitimacy is derived essentially from the adherence of its 192 states members to the
UN Charter and from the work the world body performs on behalf of its members around the
world. A web of several hundred treaties negotiated under UN auspices gives expression to the
wishes of its members and helps to regulate the behaviour of governments towards each other
and towards their own people. The UN meets at the level of Permanent Representatives and
other diplomats and is in near-constant session, addressing an open-ended agenda that extends
from peace and war to economic and social development. Leaders from around the world
participate in large numbers (over 150 in 2005, for example) in the annual General Debate in
the General Assembly each September and in occasional, quite exceptional Security Council
sessions. For example, in September 2009, Obama convened the Security Council at heads of
state and government level to promote progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament. 
The G-20, by contrast, is more virtual than concrete, has no international legal personality, is
not an organization at all and is scarcely an institution. It has no charter, no brick and mortar
assets, no standing secretariat thus far (continuity is theoretically assured by a troika of
immediately previous, current and next host countries) and no research capacity beyond that
which its member states and international organizations supply. The G-20’s work is supported
professionally by the World Bank, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the ILO, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN. 
30 For fuller treatment of this subject, see “Making Multilateralism Work: How the G-20 Can Help the United Nations,”
by Bruce Jones, Director, Managing Global Insecurity, Brookings for The Stanley Foundation, April 2010 and “The
G-20: Shifting Coalitions of Consensus Rather Than Blocs,” by Stewart Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations,
presented at the G-20 Seoul International Symposium, September, 010.
31 UN Website, January 2010.
32 See Monthly Summary Of Military And Police, Contribution To United Nations Operations, UN Website, January,
2011.
33 See Treasury Board, Government of Canada, Main Estimates 2010-11.
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The G-20 also works with the new FSB to address vulnerabilities, to develop and implement
strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability and to
monitor and report on progress in strengthening financial regulation. The G-20 has set up a
large number of working and expert groups, each co-chaired by a G-8 member and an
emerging economy country,34 covering a range of mainly economic issues in considerable
detail. Fundamentally though, the G-20’s effectiveness depends on the exceptional international
standing of its members, who number most of the most powerful countries on earth, on the
strength of the consensus they can fashion on given issues and on their willingness to act in
concert to give expression to that consensus. 
The G-20’s legitimacy derives from its success in redressing the crucial economic and financial
crises of 2008-9. It also derives from the fact that its membership accounts for 90 percent of
global Gross National Product (GNP), 80 percent of world trade and 67 percent of the planet’s
total population. The G-20 has no budget, but its members have shown they are capable of
committing truly vast resources under its auspices if circumstances warrant. These
characteristics do not confer the legitimacy inherent in universality, but nor are they trivial.
When the G-20 reaches agreement, a large part of whatever problem it is addressing is on the
way to resolution. 
The G-20’s effectiveness is immeasurably enhanced by virtue of the fact that it meets at the
level of heads of government, who are far removed from the hothouse of the UN General
Assembly and the antique ideologies, accumulated grievances, diplomatic pathologies and
institutional inertias that sometimes impede progress there. At the same time, while G-20
members can bind themselves individually and collectively, if they can reach agreement among
themselves, they cannot bind others. They need to work through more universal bodies,
including, ultimately, the UN, to get their decisions endorsed by non-G-20 member countries. 
Although the UN works best when consensus reigns among the major powers, the latter are
often at loggerheads in the organization. It is not always clear whether it is the intractability of
the problems the UN handles that causes divisions, or the UN’s divisions that make the
problems intractable. In any case, the countries of the “North” and the countries of the
overlapping Non-Aligned Movement and G-77 are often at ideological odds with each other
and working to cross-purposes. Unlike the G-8, the G-20 members have the built-in advantage
of spanning the infamous North-South divide, its members having places in the UN’s disparate
political groups and in all five geographic regions, as well. The G-20 could make a major
contribution to improving the effectiveness of the UN if it could iron out some of the
differences that divide its members and import that agreement into UN deliberations. 
To the extent, therefore, that G-20 membership induces a sense of common purpose among the
20 and diminishes its members’ identification with geographic or other groups, cooperation
under UN auspices would be made easier and more productive. As has been the case in the
IMF, consensus by the G-20 on a particular need could be a powerful stimulus to action and
reform at the UN in New York. Conversely, the very existence of the G-20 and its evident
capacity to act outside of UN parameters if non-G-20 UN members are dilatory or obstructive,
create an incentive in New York for action and cooperation. Those who cling in New York to
ideological positions could find the organization they are obstructing bypassed altogether. 
34 Government of Canada website, updated 2010-08-31.
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Not surprisingly, much of the UN’s membership is apprehensive of the G-20. They recognize
that the G-20 came into existence when and how it did because a myriad of political and
structural problems prevented existing institutions, principally the G-8 and the IMF, but also
the UN proper, from addressing the global financial crisis effectively. They realize that similar
impediments are obstructing progress on other global issues more directly under the UN’s
purview and they are well aware that the G-20 is capable of sidestepping the UN when
disagreements prevent effective action. 
At the same time, they are troubled by the G-20’s structural shortcomings. Despite the presence
at the G-20 table of some developing countries, no place is reserved for the poorest, least
developed countries and no one is carrying their proxies. Also problematic, the capable smaller
countries of the UN such as Norway, Switzerland, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand, are
absent from G-20 tables as well, effectively depriving G-20 deliberations of these countries’
generally constructive and frequently innovative diplomacy. The Norwegian Foreign Minister,
Jonas Gahr Store, who presides over one of the most widely respected and effective small
country diplomacies in the world, said bluntly in the lead-up to the Toronto and Muskoka
summits last year that “the spirit of the Congress of Vienna, where great powers assembled to
effectively govern the world, has no place in the contemporary international community. The
G-20 is sorely lacking in legitimacy and must change.” While acknowledging that “there is
value in having an effective, smaller forum of nations, equipped to act quickly when
necessary,” he warned that “if the G-20 cooperation should effectively result in decisions being
imposed on the great majority of other countries, it will quickly find itself stymied.”35
Singapore’s Permanent Representative, Vanu Gopala Menon, speaking on behalf of the Global
Governance Group, an informal group of moderate countries who have joined forces in the
hope of developing a constructive dialogue on coordination and cooperation between G-20 and
non G-20 members, made much the same point:
“We firmly believe that the G-20 process should enhance and not
undermine the UN. All countries, big and small, will be affected by
how the G-20 deals with the issues it takes under its charge. Given
the complexities and interdependencies of the global economy, it is
important for the G-20 to be consultative, inclusive and transparent
in its deliberations for its outcome to be effectively implemented on
a global scale.”36
It is in the interest of the countries of the G-20 to work out an effective relationship with the
G-172 (i.e., the UN members not also members of the G-20) because the more the 172 are
excluded, the less they will have confidence in the ultimate fairness and efficacy of the
multilateral system, and the less interest they will have in responding to G-20 wishes. Global
problems require global solutions and, as Bruce Jones of Brookings has pointed out, “however
much influence the G-20 have, the problems they confront are the kind where the weakest link
35 Jonas Gahr Store, “G-20 sorely lacking in legitimacy” New Straits Times, Mar 29, 2010.
36 Statement By Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon, Permanent Representative Of Singapore to the United Nations On
Behalf Of The Global Governance Group (3G) At The Meeting Of The Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group to
Follow Up on the Conference Last June of the World Financial And Economic Crisis and its Impact on
Development. “Strengthening The Role Of The UN In Global Economic Governance,” 2 June 2010.
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can break the chain.”37 Unless smaller states see their views reflected in decision-making
processes, or at least judge that their interests have been duly and fairly taken into account,
they are unlikely to “buy into” the solution of whatever is at issue. This kind of
unresponsiveness can have repercussions in, for example, the G-172’s attitudes towards illegal
migration, transnational crime and the drug trade, international terrorism and piracy, evasion by
unscrupulous industries of climate change regulations, the prevention of the spread of
pandemics of infectious disease, and collaboration on financial regulation notably regarding tax
havens and banking reforms, and so on. 
The G-20 needs to take outreach seriously, in ways consistent with efficacy and inclusion as
well. There are several steps the G-20 can take, none of which will be fully satisfactory to
those who are absent, but all of which are likely to be better than nothing. Most fundamentally,
the chair of the G-20 in a given year will need to consult others beyond his/her G-20
counterparts on the G-20 agenda and seek substantive rather than pro forma input through, for
example, the African Union (AU), ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, the Organization of American States, etc.  
A further idea is to adopt at least an informal constituency approach, so that G-20 leaders at the
table, or some of them, carry de facto proxies of those not present. Canada and the UK could,
for example, “represent” the Commonwealth. Canada and France could do the same for the
Francophonie while Mexico and Brazil could carry briefs for Latin America, etc. This would
imply effective consultation with members of the constituency before G-20 meetings and
timely debriefings and cooperation afterwards. A variation on this idea is that G-20 finance
ministers should form a council to take strategic decisions on the international monetary
system, effectively replacing the IMF monetary and financial committee, with each G-20
country representing a constituency of smaller countries, mirroring the IMF’s system of
constituencies.38 At the same time, the more effectively the G-20 worked with the UN, the less
need there would be for outreach and for G-20 members to try to represent constituencies,
informal or otherwise.
In order to ensure a voice for the G-172 at the G-20 table, especially for the poorest, the UN
Secretary-General could attend the G-20 as a matter of right, as could the heads of the IMF and
the head of the World Bank when economic issues were on the agenda. While the Secretary-
General works for the G-20 as well as the G-172, it is in the latter capacity that he/she can give
voice to the absent. As is the case with the EU, the AU and any other transcendent political
unions could attend as a matter of convention. Further, the UN (and the Bretton Woods
organizations) could be encouraged to contribute their perspectives and ideas at G-20
preparatory ministerial meetings and working groups. 
There are numerous global issues on which the G-20 and the UN can help each other, but two
stand out: Security Council reform and climate change.
37 Bruce Jones, , Policy Brief, Stanley Foundation, “Making Multilateralism Work: How the Can Help the United
Nations” April 2010.
38 See Peggy Hollinger, Financial Times, Wednesday February 9, 2011.
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The G-20 and Reform of the Security Council.
The UN Security Council is the world’s top security table. It is empowered under Chapter VI
and VII of the UN Charter to authorize the use of force, the only international body that has
that legal right. Signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty pay due deference to the UN Charter
and undertake under its Article I “to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Under
Article V of the Treaty, they pledge to come to each other’s defence “in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations.” The Security Council is also equipped by Chapter VII of the UN Charter with the
power to “legislate” for all member countries, for example its post 9/11 decision to deny
terrorists access to the world’s financial system, a power that the self-appointed G-8 and G-20
do not (and should not) have. 
The Council’s writ covers peace and security, fairly broadly defined. Major international
political and security issues continue to be brought to the UN for deliberation and decision
where possible and for surveillance and management where solutions are not possible. For
example, the US successfully sought Security Council authorization in 2001 to use military
force in Afghanistan in response to 9/11 and again in 2011 in Libya, but was denied
authorization by the Council in 2003 to use military force to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime
in Baghdad. The Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006 was brought to the Council for a diplomatic
conclusion. Further, the international sanctions in response to the alleged Iranian nuclear
weapons program are currently coordinated in the Council. There are literally dozens of less
high-profile issues on the Council’s docket.  
There is no prospect that the G-20, operating at leaders’ level, or even at foreign ministers’
level, will supplant the Council. The five permanent members of the Security Council are
unlikely in the extreme to acquiesce in any sort of formal encroachment by the G-20 onto
Council turf and in doing so to undermine their own privileged positions there. The Council is
too valuable to them, and taking on its burdens would be too time-consuming and impractical
for leaders. 
There is, though, a strong argument for the G-20 members to invest greater effort in making
the Council work better. G-20 leaders could, for example, debate certain issues among
themselves and import whatever consensus they can reach into the Council via their Permanent
Representatives, as the G-8 did to end the Kosovo war in 1999. G-20 members could also
participate more actively in Council-sanctioned, UN-led military missions. Participation by
G-20 countries, including Canada, would upgrade the UN’s capacity to act effectively. G-20
leaders could also inject high-level political energy periodically into issues of surpassing
importance, as Obama did in 2009 in chairing a Security Council session devoted to arms
control and disarmament.  
One issue on which the G-20 could make a major contribution is reform of the UN Security
Council, specifically the number and composition of permanent seats. For a generation,
member states of the UN have endeavored vainly to revamp Council membership. Several
emerging market countries—who are members of the G-20—see themselves as entitled to
permanent Security Council seats by virtue of their significant and growing standing in
international relations. Further, neither Africa nor Latin America has a permanent seat on the
Council, whereas Europe has two permanent seats, three counting Russia. For the aspirant
countries, a Council that does not reflect contemporary power realities is unrepresentative and
illegitimate. Worse, it is ineffective and their solution is to enlarge the Council to include
themselves as permanent members. 
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Others do not equate enlargement with reform and regard the whole idea of permanency with
distrust. Some opponents of an increase of permanent seats cite the cases of Darfur, Rwanda,
Srebrenica, etc., to argue that the Council has a performance deficit more than a
representational deficit. They contend that more members do not necessarily increase the
Council’s effectiveness, and that permanency is in any case incompatible with accountability.
Further, opponents of adding permanent seats, including Canada, favour democratic, electoral
practices over autarchic, anachronistic privilege.   
Resolving the issue of permanent seats is important because the role of the Council is
important. The G-20 might well be in a position to assist the reform process in the coming
months and years, as all the main protagonists are members of the G-20 and in some respects
are the economic equivalent of the Security Council. It should be possible for experienced
leaders for whom compromise and politics as the art of the possible are everyday realities to
find practical political accommodations. 
It happens that there is a potentially useful overlap between the G-20 and the Security Council
in the next period. Ten G-20 members (six G-8 members) will be on the Council in 2011, as
will five of the leading six aspirants for permanent Council membership. While the overlap
might lessen the perceived need for the G-20 to address political issues, it also presents an
opportunity that might not come soon again to solve this chronic problem. Whether the G-20
wishes to seize it remains to be seen. 
The G-20 and Climate Change39
The leaders’ G-20 was created to deal with the last economic crisis. The next economic crisis
might well be driven by an inadequate global response to climate change. Preventing climate
change, the mother of all tragedies of the commons, was never going to be easy. There are only
a few examples in modern history of humanity coming together in its own enlightened self-
interest to change its collective course on a major governance issue: World War III has been
avoided (so far), the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons has (largely) been averted
and the ozone layer has been (mostly) preserved.
For climate change, as for most over-arching global issues, the crucial negotiations have
usually taken place in the back rooms of large gatherings, among groups of 20 or so of the
most engaged countries. In the Copenhagen conference in November 2009, even that process
was bypassed as five countries—the US, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, some of the
worst polluters—cut a deal among themselves that they then offered to others on a take–it-
or–leave-it basis. 
The Copenhagen solution, however, was inadequate substantively and unfair procedurally.
While it had some merit—more than 70 countries including 35 developing countries signed on
to the deal and pledged to take “nationally appropriate actions—it lacked targets and timetables
and it back-end loaded its promises of financial assistance to poorer countries harmed by a
problem the richer countries created. Further, G-20 members from the EU and Japan, South
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Australia, Turkey, Indonesia and Russia were sidelined from the
backroom negotiations as was Canada, itself a significant generator of greenhouse gases
(GHG) and the leading foreign supplier of oil, gas, electricity and uranium to the worst GHG
emitter, the US. Nor were the innocent victims represented.
39 For a fuller treatment of the G-20 and climate change, see Barry Carin, PhD, Senior Fellow, Centre for International
Governance innovation, “Can the G-20 Save the Environment?” Centre for International Governance Innovation,
prepared for The School of Public Policy, April 2010.
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More progress was made at Cancun, Mexico in November 2010 (after Copenhagen, the bar
was set low) and a more constructive, even hopeful tone was established for subsequent
negotiations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres called it “a new beginning…not what is ultimately
required but [an] essential foundation on which to build greater, collective ambition.”40
Nevertheless, in the absence of any prospect of progress in the US Congress on climate
change, much had to be kicked down the road to Durban in the fall of 2011 and likely beyond
the next US presidential and congressional elections in 2012.  
Agreement by all 192 members of the United Nations, while essential, remains elusive.
Negotiations have been too unwieldy and complex, too hampered by politics and contradictory
ideologies and too vulnerable to the actions of a handful of spoilers to be able to reconcile
competing interests and conclude an effective omnibus global treaty. Partly in frustration with
the difficulty of making progress while emissions grow and the climate change clock ticks,
negotiators have in some cases sought to reach agreement on those discrete parts of the
problem on which agreement is achievable. 
World Bank President Richard Zoellick encapsulated the challenge when he called for
“reaching real results on the ground while at the same time working on overall international
regimes and arrangements, and not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good.”41 A notable
accomplishment at Cancun in this respect was agreement to create a program—Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)—that uses market and financial
incentives to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Elsewhere,
coalitions of the willing have been turning to “bottom-up” actions on a national and regional
basis, although that course risks making the world a crazy quilt of incompatible regulations and
trade protectionism masquerading as climate sensitivity. 
Whether the solution is to be an over-arching mega-deal or a series of internationally
sanctioned regional or issue-specific deals, the world has to be brought to act. The G-20 is, by
its own declaration, the world’s “premier economic forum,” and climate change mitigation and
adaptation raise primordial economic issues, including the probability that not acting promptly
is going to be more costly for all than acting promptly would be, as British economist Nicholas
Stern has persuasively argued.42
It would make sense for climate change, starting perhaps with its economic and development
dimensions, to be put on the G-20 agenda. Given the fundamental disagreements that continue to
bedevil progress, particularly over who bears the major responsibility for creating the problem
and on whom it is incumbent to act first and do most to fix it, as well as the reluctance of the
American Congress to acknowledge US responsibility and support the president on this issue,
miracles will not happen. But the greater the extent to which the G-20 can narrow differences
between themselves on principles and import some consensus into the necessarily larger UN
negotiating framework, the more likely it is for progress on climate change to be made.
40
“UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún delivers balanced package of decisions, restores faith in multilateral
process” Press Release, (Cancún, 11 December 2010
41 Robert B. Zoellick, President, World Bank Group, Transcript of Remarks at Cancun Summit on REDD+, December
7, 2010.
42 See Nicholas Stern, “The Global Deal: Climate Change and the Creation of a New Era of Progress and Prosperity,”
Public Affairs/Perseus Books Group, 2009. See p 90 ff.
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The G-20 and the UN: Neither Is Sufficient, Both Are Necessary
The UN remains a necessary but not sufficient response to globalization, as is the G-20. The
inescapable conclusion is that there is room and need for both the UN and the G-20, and for
cooperation between them. Effective global governance depends considerably on the success of
both the nascent G-20 and of the sexagenarian UN. 
The UN embodies universality and the G-20 efficacy. Together, they can produce synergies,
with the G-20 strengthening the UN by reducing the gaps among the major powers on
contentious issues, making decision-making in the world body easier and more effective, with
the UN returning the favour by extending the G-20’s effectiveness vis-à-vis the G-172, a group
that the G-20 cannot command but whose cooperation it does need. The UN, for its part, needs
to be sensibly responsive and strategically savvy, resisting the blandishments of its ideological
“spoilers.” And the G-20 needs to take the initiative to develop an effective modus operandi
with non-members of the group to resolve legitimate issues of inclusion and exclusion, find a
way to give voice in its deliberations to the less powerful poorer countries and to the small but
very competent richer ones. 
The G-20, International Security and Asia
The G-20 has not given itself a direct security mandate. It’s effectiveness in bringing better
governance to the global economy and increased oversight to the international financial system
will, nonetheless, be beneficial in security terms in a world in which GDP is as good or better
an indicator of power and influence as military capability, and also a more urgent and less
dangerous subject of contention. Further, to the extent the G-20 is successful in promoting an
environment of trust in which all acquire “habits of cooperation,” there will be spillovers into
security relations, reducing frictions between its members and facilitating problem solving, as
has been the case in the past between Russia and the rest in the G-8. This could be especially
beneficial for the Asian members of the G-20 which have fewer effective organizations within
which to subsume their differences and work cooperatively. 
As the current economic crisis recedes, as it inevitably will, the G-20 can pick up on security
issues and challenges, much as the G-7/8 did after the macroeconomic instabilities and energy
price shocks of the 1970s. Initially the G-7/8 also had no security mandate, but over time its
members found it necessary and useful to expand their agendas to discuss and, where possible,
act in concert on the major and pressing political/security issues of the day, from Bosnia and
the Kosovo war, on which the group was divided (Russia versus the rest), to Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, terrorism, crime and illegal drugs, failing states, the
dénouement of the Cold War, the safeguarding and destruction of nuclear and other weapons
materials, the Middle East and other regional hotspots, etc. Many leaders found dealing with
these political/security issues a welcome respite from the more technical, some might say
dismal, albeit important, fields of international finance and economics. If the G-8 experience is
any guide, the G-20 leaders will likewise progress to political/security issues. If they don’t, the
G-20 might die of boredom!
All G-20 countries are significant members of the international community in their own rights,
but they are obviously far from equal; power disparities among them remain important
background and sometimes foreground factors in their meetings. Militarily, the US, in
particular, bestrides the group like a colossus. According to the 2009 Yearbook of the
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), US defence expenditures in 2008, in
current dollars, were $607 billion USD, just over 40 percent of total global defence
expenditures (a relative decline attributable in part to currency volatility—the figure has
approached 50 percent in the recent past). The US outspends the next ten countries combined,
five of which are allies. That kind of expenditure buys stupendous capability including, for
example, 11 aircraft carrier groups, as many as the rest of the world combined. In Asia, the US
navy effectively ensures balances among China, Japan, the Koreas, Russia, Taiwan and, to a
lesser extent, India. The G-20 changes little in this regard, beyond reducing tensions.
The central strategic imponderable of the G-20 for a long time to come will be the relationship
between the US and China, financial Siamese twins joined at the wallet. China needs a strong
US economy to consume its excess industrial output, thereby helping to prevent labour unrest
and the US, with its nearly unprecedented indebtedness (the worst since 1792, the Second
World War excepted43), needs a growing China to keep lending it money to cover its deficits.
As observed by US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, “China needs the United States, but
the United States also benefits very substantially from our rapidly expanding economic
relationship with China… We have a great deal invested in each other’s success.”44
China, although more assertive latterly, especially as regards Japan, has generally been
circumspect in the military expression of its personality, first because its primordial interest is
economic development which it does not wish to jeopardize and second because, classically,
the more China asserts its power, the more it unites others in opposition to itself. While the
sheer size of China’s economy is causing it to bump up against others more and Chinese
leaders realize that fulfilling their needs at home requires a more activist, global strategy,45 they
are still behaving largely according to former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s variously
expressed maxim, “conceal ambition and hide claws.”46
US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in reflecting on his talks with Chinese leaders earlier
this year in China, had commented that “…both the military and civilian leadership [of China]
seemed determined to carry this relationship further and build upon it… I’m very encouraged
going forward.”47 In the latter part of 2010, however, strains emerged again in the US-China
relationship, with each accusing the other of pursuing economic policies that contravene
accepted international rules and norms. Different conceptions of human rights, accentuated by
the Chinese response to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu
Xiaobo, also disturbed the relationship, as did evidently different assessments of how to
respond to North Korean belligerency. Perhaps partly for these reasons, during Chinese
President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011, both leaders were at pains to 
43 See especially “American Profligacy and American Power: The Consequences of Fiscal irresponsibility,” by Roger
C. Altman and Richard Haass, Foreign Affairs, November-December, 2010.
44 US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s Remarks on “The Path Ahead for the U.S.-China Economic
Relationship,” School Of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, January 12, 2011. 
45 See Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer”, Foreign Affairs, November-December, 2010.
46 Emmott,, p 48.
47
“Gates Says China Relations Ready for Next Level”, By Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, Mutianyu,
China, Jan. 12, 2011.
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show that they can work together for their mutual benefit. Hu described the purpose of his visit
as being “to increase mutual trust, enhance friendship, deepen cooperation and advance the
positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-US relationship for the 21st century.”48 An
effective G-20 that deepens understanding of the international economic system and
encourages acceptable compromises on zero-sum problems can help that process along, and
bring security benefits as it does so.
It was as a hedge against China, and perhaps in the hope of leaving some sort of positive
legacy, that former US president George W. Bush initiated a strategic partnership with India.
Relations between India and Japan are similarly developing and for some of the same
reasons—to strengthen India vis-à-vis China. China, for its part, is cultivating its relations with
Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka to offset perceived Indo-American and Indo-Japanese
encroachment. Indian relations with Pakistan, especially if the latter descends further into
Islamism and terrorism against its big neighbour, have the potential to split the G-20, as does
the erratic, belligerent behaviour of North Korea. Taiwan is another potential spoiler.
India, like China, welcomes the advantages inherent in G-20 membership but wants to be
recognized as a developing major power, with different, lesser responsibilities than the richer
countries. India, like Brazil to some extent and some of the other southern members of the
G-20 as well, is looking, Janus-like, backwards to the impoverished South and forward to its
new standing among the world’s major powers. India is gratified by the recognition of its new
standing and the respect and deference that goes with it, but is loathe to give up the residual
advantages of solidarity among the countries of the South and the South’s voting power at the
UN. India is nonetheless happy to benefit from G-20 membership, notably the opportunity the
G-20 offers to protect its interests directly, especially in avoiding commitments to measures
that could slow down economic growth. Much of the international discussion of India focuses
on its hearteningly rapid progress, but it has major, underestimated and underreported
problems, including extensive poverty, ethnic and religious divisions, serious health and
educational shortfalls and illiteracy. 
Strictly militarily, Russia remains the second most powerful country in the world, with the
world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear warheads of all kinds, in excess of 16,000, albeit useable
only in suicidal circumstances. At the same time, Russia has very little soft power, i.e., getting
results through emulation rather than coercion. In any case, in its vocal opposition to NATO’s
expansion into Ukraine and by its own military intervention in Georgia, Russia has made it
clear that it intends neither to be taken for granted nor dominated. Nevertheless, the ratification
by the US of the New START Treaty has eased some of the underlying tensions between the
two, as have changes in NATO’s ballistic missile defence posture that less directly threatens
Russia.  
NATO’s expansion eastward and Russia’s truculence notwithstanding, NATO appears gradually
to be transforming itself from an active alliance into an insurance policy against the remote
possibility of return to a more dangerous time. In the absence of an enemy posing a credible,
existential threat to the West, traditional, formal defensive alliances will matter progressively
less, and good international governance, which the G-20 can facilitate, will matter more.  
48 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao of the
People’s Republic of China in an Exchange of Toasts at the State Dinner January 19, 2011.
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To the extent that the G-20 qua G-20 will concern itself directly with security, it is likely to be
with countries beyond its own membership and triggered by phenomena such as organized
crime and terrorism, although the threat the latter poses is comparatively small (many more
people died from extreme weather last year than from terrorism cumulatively in the past
40 years49). In most cases, the most effective instruments against terrorism are likely to be
cooperation by intelligence and police services, rather than armies. In any case, the prospect of
terrorists armed with nuclear weapons tends to unite rather than divide the various members of
the G-20.50
International responses to conventional and unconventional security challenges are likely to be
“ad hoc, informal, improvised and opportunistic,”51 as well as pre-emptive. Nor will the
protagonists necessarily be exclusively or even primarily the permanent members of the
Security Council. Cooperation is growing among countries that are not themselves great
powers by traditional definitions but that nonetheless have both compelling strategic interests
in a peaceful and prosperous region and world and the diplomatic and military capacity and
political disposition to influence outcomes. Brazil and Turkey’s initiative on the alleged Iranian
nuclear weapons program is a case in point; there are others. 
Further, the G-20 can contribute to international security by distinguishing between stability and
security. In the interests of promoting the latter, counter-productive emphasis has often been
placed on preserving the former, for example in earlier years in Iran and latterly in Egypt and
most of the Arab world, with the result that the political lid has blown off repeatedly, from Tehran
to Gaza to Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli. In an age of satellite television, the Internet and social media,
change in repressive states seems likely to accelerate. To the extent that G-20 leaders
accommodate, even embrace, such change and promote widespread economic progress, they can
bring about a dynamism that is likely to be inherently less dangerous than fossilized stability.
THE G-20: STOCK-TAKING AND THE FUTURE
On the eve of the Seoul summit, former prime minister Martin, the godfather of the G-20, said
that it was “critical that it complete the cycle from global crisis-responder to global steering
committee, for that is what is required if globalization is to work.”52 That transition has not yet
happened. The G-20 has done comparatively well in pursuing financial re-engineering but has
done less well in addressing the highly political tasks of resolving the current account, trade
and budget imbalances conundrum, whose causes lie deep in the economic philosophies and
internal practices of the world’s largest economic players. Nor has the G-20 made much
progress on issues of a more indirect economic character and still less on security issues. More
fundamentally, the G-20 has yet to develop a consensus on the nature of what ties them
together, i.e., global interdependencies
49 2010’s world gone wild: Quakes, floods, blizzards. Seth Borenstein And Julie Reed Bell, Associated Press –
December 19, 2010.
50
“GDP Matters More Than Force: A US Foreign Policy for an Age of Economic Power,” by Leslie H. Gelb, Foreign
Affairs, November-December, 2010, p35.
51
“Collective Conflict Management: A New Formula for Global Peace and Security Cooperation,” by Chester A.
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, forthcoming.
52 Remarks by The Right Honorable Paul Martin, Former Prime Minister, Canada,  Keynote Speaker, to the  Seoul
International Symposium Toward The Consolidation Of G-20 Summits:From Crisis Committee To Global Steering
Committee September 27-29, 2010 G-20 Summit Site, COEX, Seoul
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The G-20 has shown that it can generate policy consensus and coordination when its members
manifest the requisite political will to drive reform on major global challenges. It is the best
solution so far to the legitimacy/efficiency trade-off, combining inclusiveness and
representativeness, albeit far from universality with capacity and effectiveness.53 But it is not a
panacea. 
While consensus is easier to generate in smaller bodies than the UN General Assembly or large
international conferences, it is not yet clear how much easier in practice it is to do so in the
G-20. National interests are not a factor of the setting in which they are addressed and ways of
thinking and acting established over generations are not modified easily. Further, for the
heretofore hegemonic US, G-20 partnership needs to mean not just hearing others before
deciding and acting, but rather developing shared assessments and engaging cooperatively—
rusty skills in Beltway-bound Washington. 
For some others, notably China and India, if the G-20 is to prosper, their conceptions of their
interests need expanding to include more fully the well-being and effectiveness of the
institution, which has to be more than the sum of disparate interests if it is to work. Further, it
is not clear that they and Brazil, among others, see the G-20 as a more cordial venue in which
to pursue their interests than the UN whose legitimacy, solidarity and universality they value.
Further, some are wary of the risk inherent in small group negotiations of being “jammed” into
making deals, as China apparently felt was the case in the backroom bargaining at the climate
change negotiations in Copenhagen. For the G-20 qua G-20 to prosper and achieve its
potential, all 20 governments will have to reconcile self-interest with the common interest, and
privilege cooperation over autarchy, multilateralism (or at least plurilateralism) over
unilateralism, the effective over the merely efficient and the legal over the expedient. All of
this is easier said than done, especially in the absence of the unifying power of major common
threats.
There are practical problems, too. First, the G-20 agendas are too technical for many leaders to
handle, even supported by the informal sherpa process. It is unrealistic to expect a group of
leaders, most of whom are not themselves technically expert and all of whom are lacking the
luxury of time, to resolve complex multi-dimensional problems in brief, informal meetings.
Such technical issues should be the province of G-20 finance ministers and central bankers
who, in contrast, meet several times a year and are backed up by dedicated ministries and
staffs. A professional secretariat (or “non-secretariat”), building on formal G-20 ministerial
processes, might help leaders cope better.
Second, G-20 members’ disparate cultures, values, governance and economic philosophies,
domestic political structures and imperatives and unequal levels of economic and social
development make finding common ground difficult. Internal communications and logistics
challenges among the G-20 make that task more difficult.  
53 See “Making the G-20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy,” by
Barry Carin, Paul Heinbecker, Gordon Smith and Ramesh Thakur, CIGI G-20 Papers, No. 2, June 2010.
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English is not quite a lingua franca for the G-8, but it is even less so for the G-20. About half of the
latter’s participants have to rely on translation, making cacophony a risk (even the UN uses only five
official languages) and diminishing the spontaneity of exchanges. The more translation is necessary in
the course of discussions, the more the conversation is stilted and the more formalized and less
spontaneous the process becomes. Further, the more technical the issues—notably as regards the
intricacies of international finance—the less some leaders are comfortable discussing them
extemporaneously and the more they have recourse to talking points setting out their positions, further
formalizing the proceedings and shifting the emphasis from the search for compromise to the defence
of interests, thereby rendering the leaders’ experience as something akin to a political root canal. If the
G-20 is to progress, it will need to leave economic and technical details to finance ministers and bank
governors, and deal instead with the politics of international relations where only they have the
authority to cut the deals needed to advance global governance.
Logistically, the G-20 suffers from disadvantages of size, at least compared to the G-8, and operates
less intimately. Meeting rooms are bigger than at G-8 sessions and thus less conducive to generating
familiarity among the participants. To obtain the maximum benefits from the meetings of the G-20, the
number of people at the table needs to be tightly restricted. The leaders need proximity and intimacy to
really understand each other’s perspectives—especially their disparate political interests and
limitations—and to engage each other. Distance across large tables destroys spontaneity and favours
formality and disengagement. As a consequence, only 20 government leaders should have dedicated
seats at the G-20 table. One or two additional rotating seats, as in the UN Security Council, could be
allocated to non-government leaders to use when invited by the host chair to speak. Or perhaps there
could be inner and outer circles, with national leaders seated at the inner ring and institutional leaders
at the outer.
If the experience of the G-8 is any guide, and it is in the interests of the G-20 as an institution that it
should be, frequent contact will lead to better understandings of the political constraints within which
others must operate. As participants come to know each other better and to the extent that the common
ground between them expands, misunderstandings, miscalculations and unrealistic expectations are
likely to diminish and more practicable and cooperative ideas to emerge. An effective G-20, in which
its members meet frequently and work cooperatively, can instill a greater sense of community among
countries accustomed to seeing each other in competitive terms.  
Evidence so far is that the G-8, though broadly like-minded, is unlikely to constitute a formal caucus
within the G-20, although the EU will informally do so. While the migration of economic and political
power to Asia is generating a growing Asian voice in the G-20, the competitive nature of the various
bilateral relationships within the region makes the emergence of an Asian caucus unlikely.
Nor, for similar reasons, are the countries of the other regions likely to band together. The existence in
one institution of 20 of the world’s most significant and capable states with disparate interests does
increase the probability of temporary, issue-based alliances forming within the group as problems and
opportunities come to the fore and then retreat. Such a pro-tem alliance was evident when Harper
made common cause with China, India and others to resist pressure from G-8 friends like Britain,
Germany and France to impose a bank tax at the G-20 meeting in Toronto.54 Former British prime
minister Lord Henry Palmerston’s insight that nations have no permanent friends, just permanent
interests, seems likely to come back into vogue in the G-20.
54 Campbell Clark, “Harper’s bank-tax victory has left some scars,” Globe and Mail , June 09, 2010.
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A further likely development is cross-regional cooperation among the G-20 countries that are
not great powers but that nonetheless have compelling strategic interests in a stable and
prosperous world and the capacity to intervene, e.g., the effort by Turkey and Brazil to mediate
the international dispute over the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program. Whether within the
G-20, or outside of it, there is ample scope for new partnerships to develop in the realms of
security, development, global governance and international institutional innovation. There is
also room, indeed a need, for cooperation between G-20 members and capable G-172
members. 
Several lessons can reasonably confidently be drawn from the G-20 experience thus far. First,
in order to address major crises effectively, it is imperative to bring all the key stakeholders
into the discussion. Second, the broadening of the circle of participants sets in train a process
of power-sharing and pluralistic decision-making whose full import is probably not even now
adequately assimilated around the world, not even by its members. Third, the interest of the
participants in the forum thus created wanes as the crisis triggering its creation retreats. The
pace of progress has slowed perceptibly as meeting has succeeded meeting and the recession
has eased. The instinct to cooperate in a crisis, what Harper variously called “the fellowship of
the lifeboat” and “enlightened sovereignty,” yields to national interests and nationalist habits as
the crisis recedes and the lifeboat reaches less turbulent waters. 
The fourth lesson, perhaps the most important at this stage, is that expectations need to be kept
realistic. The demands on the G-20 for immediate, concrete results have been enormous and to
some extent understandable considering the financial stakes. But the demands are also
unsatisfiable; the issues are difficult and progress is going to be neither easy nor fast. G-20
leaders would be wise not to issue promises in order to create the impression that they are
doing something and should not establish markers for the sake of appearing accountable.  
While it is right for the public and the media to expect results, it is a mistake to judge the
efficacy of the group on the basis of the contents of one communiqué or another at one summit
or another. The issues the G-20 are wrestling with are complex. A true appreciation of the
progress that the G-20 is making, or not making, in resolving them requires a longer view.
Understanding the problems, reaching agreements on them, fulfilling them, assessing the
results and recalibrating approaches take time. Further, the very process of 20 of the most
powerful leaders in the world meeting regularly and probing each others’ arguments and
reassessing their own is important in itself. It is through such interaction and cooperation that
leaders grow intellectually and that they progress from the gritty imperatives of domestic
politics to the higher plains of global statesmanship. In any case, it is better that leaders be
talking than fighting; to paraphrase former British prime minister Sir Winston Churchill: jaw,
jaw is better than war, war. 
G-20 members should not shrink from making the difficulty of achieving reforms clear to the
media and the public. Allowing themselves to be pressured into presenting a happy, unified
message of cooperation just to get through a media-intensive event risks either misrepresenting
the views of some or settling for the lowest common denominator in their negotiations; either
outcome undermines the credibility of the process and increases the pressure for more artificial
results. As Alan Beattie of the Financial Times has argued, G-20 communications need to
reflect the increasing detail of the debate and its lengthening time horizon.55
55 Alan Beattie, “Successful Communications Strategies for G-20 Summits, at the Conference on the New Dynamics of
Summitry: Institutional Innovations for G-20 Summits, September 27-9 2010, Seoul.
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The larger story of the G-20, including its much criticized performance at Seoul, is not that the
G-20 is failing to resolve intractable issues but that the issues are intractable and the G-20 is
trying to solve them. In any case, there is no other forum where prospects for agreement are
any better. Just leaving the problems to the market to sort would have punishing consequences
all round. 
THE G-20 AND CANADA
The Importance of Summitry and Personal Diplomacy56
As few doubt the axiom that it is better to be a policy-maker than a policy-taker, the most
coveted seats in the world are at the G-20 table. It is at these summits where the world’s
leading countries address themselves to the world’s most important and urgent economic
issues. Having a place at that table positions leaders to do good by contributing to the
improvement of global governance, protecting their people’s interests and advancing their own
political standing. It also gives leaders opportunities to develop at relatively low transaction
cost personal relationships with each other that can be invaluable down the road
Like most other countries, Canada needs opportunities and vehicles to advance its foreign
policy interests. The G-20 provides both. It is enormously in Canada’s interest to be present in
G-20 summits and in a position to influence the discussions and conclusions to advance its
ideas. While no one attending G-20 gatherings forgets for a moment which countries around
the table are the most powerful and which leaders are in the strongest political positions, the
second-tier leaders have the opportunity nevertheless to advance their ideas to the group. In
such intimate gatherings, the quality of the ideas a leader can offer can offset disadvantages in
size. In June in Toronto, for example, Harper was able to lead the effort to turn aside the
British, French and German push for a bank tax, which made sense in a European context but
not in Canada.  
For Canada, as for most other major countries, the prime minister’s leadership is essential to
advance Canadian interests internationally. Personal diplomacy by leaders is important because
it is one of the surest ways of getting important issues addressed by their counterparts. Given
that in every capital, but especially in the major capitals of G-20 countries, there is tremendous
competition for the leaders’ time and attention, and, like everyone else, those leaders have only
24 hours in their days, some things, even important things, will never come to their attention.
For Canada to get an issue to the top of another leader’s agenda, especially if the issue matters
more to Canada than it does to the country in question, it is important that there be a personal
relationship between the leaders, and that the leaders’ programmers realize that their principals
value it and want to preserve it. Such relationships facilitate the scheduling of bilateral
meetings and the maintenance of telephone contact between meetings. They force both stock-
taking by the respective bureaucracies and decision-making by the leaders. The G-20 is an
excellent vehicle for developing personal relationships.
56 For fuller treatment of this subject see Paul Heinbecker, “Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for
Canada,” Key Porter 2010, on which this section draws. 
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Personal relations are vital,57 and the onus inevitably is on the smaller partner to take the
initiative to get issues important to them addressed. In his memoirs, former prime minister
Brian Mulroney observed how hard he worked to make sure Canada was noticed, and “that
membership [in the G-8] was personified so that others could see that Canada and its
leadership were making a contribution.” His close personal relationships with former US
presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush were indispensable to his broad
international influence and in solving bilateral issues. His influence in Washington reinforced
his effectiveness abroad and, conversely, his influence in the world enhanced his effectiveness
in Washington. Summitry made it possible for him to develop relationships with European
leaders including French president François Mitterrand, British prime minister Margaret
Thatcher, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian president Boris Yeltsin, among others
and to sustain this extraordinary network. What was true for Mulroney is true for all Canadian
prime ministers, including Harper. 
Summitry is challenging for any leader. The number of multilateral summits has multiplied
over the years and the issues addressed at these gatherings have become more encompassing,
more numerous and, substantively and politically, more important. Summits of various kinds
happen on average more than once a month (for the Canadian prime minister and include the
G-20, the G-8, the UN General Debate, the Commonwealth, the Francophonie, the EU, NATO,
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Summit of the Americas, the Caribbean and
North American Free Trade Agreement-related events, as well as sectoral conferences like
Climate Change in Copenhagen and the Commission on Information and Accountability for
Women’s and Children’s Health in Geneva, among others). The physical wear and tear is
significant, the travel is time-consuming, the stakes are frequently high, much of the media
tends to score the event in terms of winners and losers and the outcomes are only partly
programmable (for example, the Birmingham G-8 summit in 1998 had to respond to the
Pakistan and Indian nuclear tests that took place shortly beforehand and the Toronto G-20
summit had to respond to the sovereign debt crisis). Yeltsin’s affinity for vodka produced many
an unscripted G-8 chapter. 
Participation in international summits, meetings, and conferences constitutes important, even
necessary, growth opportunities for newly elected/appointed leaders. Summits expose them to
the political needs, expertise, personalities and, in some cases unsparing judgments of the only
peers they have (German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and others were so critical of Canadian
economic policies at the G-8 summit in Bonn in 1978 that when prime minister Pierre Trudeau
came home, he abruptly changed them58). Summits require leaders to expand their intellectual
horizons and to check their instincts and theories against reality (Reagan was an exception,
sticking close to the talking points on his 4 X 6 cards, and apparently immune to criticism,
including from Trudeau, for doing so). 
Hosting summits is a great deal more demanding than simply attending them, as the host takes
charge of herding the guests, developing an agenda cooperatively with other governments,
conducting the proceedings and endeavouring to deliver outcomes that serve his own political
and policy needs and that are reasonably acceptable to fellow leaders, while hoping for as
many favourable judgments as possible from his own media and population. Used strategically,
these summit meetings also afford prime ministers opportunities to conduct bilateral business
with other participants, obviating the need for additional travel.  
57 See especially “Canada, the G-8 and the G-20:A Canadian Approach to Shaping Global Governance in a Shifting
International Environment,” by Gordon S. Smith of CIGI and Peter Heap, SPP Research Papers series, Volume 3,
Issue 8, November 2010, p 13.    
58 John English, “Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Trudeau, 1968-2000”, by Alfred A Knopf, 2009, p373,
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Largely as a consequence of the frequency, significance and breadth of the agendas of summits,
prime ministers are increasingly becoming the personification of Canadian diplomacy, although
an integrating world ensures that there is plenty to keep foreign ministers busy. It is a very
demanding responsibility and, whatever the talents of a prime minister, to function optimally
he or she needs to draw on the research strengths and vast experience of a professional public
service. The public visibility of a prime minister at a summit is the proverbial tip of the iceberg
of the massive preparatory effort. 
Partly because of the G-20, international diplomacy has become increasingly economic in
character. The financial crisis of 2008 and its enormous scope and complexity have demanded
specialized expertise, very considerably increasing the international role of Finance and Bank
of Canada officials who have been extraordinarily effective in supporting Harper and Flaherty
in G-20 summit discussions of complex and crucial finance and banking issues. On the non-
financial aspects of summits, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provide the essential
support, including the very influential role of the prime minister’s personal representative or
sherpa in summit parlance.
WHAT SHOULD CANADA DO?59
It is evident in an age of multiple centres of power that summitry is only going to become
more important. We need therefore first to register in our collective consciousness just how
significant summitry is for Canada and to recognize that the G-20 is central to that reality. It is
at summits that the world’s most important governance issues are deliberated and decided
upon, affecting Canadian sovereignty, security and prosperity. No other organization or
institution, at least potentially, offers more advantages and opportunities to us to advance
crucial interests than the G-20 does. The creation of a G-2 or a G-5 would force us to rely on
others to protect our vital interests, a dubious proposition at best. We should, therefore, treat
the effectiveness of the G-20 as a Canadian national interest and work at making it happen. 
Second, we should cement Canadian membership in the G-20 by making ourselves as useful
and indispensable to the institution as possible. We are there as a right, with an economy that
ranks us in the top 10 or 11 in the world now and which seems likely to rank us well into the
top 20 even if the emerging countries grow as rapidly as expected. But our reputation has lost
some of its luster in recent years, as the UN Security Council election loss showed, and we
need to ensure that our enviable and legitimate strengths are not deprecated and our standing
not further downgraded. 
Third, we need to regard G-20 membership as the near equivalent of a permanent seat for
Canada on the UN Security Council; this is all the more true now that we have little prospect
of sitting again on the Council for several years. We should endeavour, therefore, to shape
G-20 agendas to promote our own interests. We should engage actively on financial reform and
institutional innovation and promote the discussion of non-financial issues in the G-20, notably
the economic development of the world’s poorer countries, UN reform, climate change and
energy security. 
59 For fuller treatment of this subject see Paul Heinbecker, “Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for
Canada,” Key Porter 2010, on which this section draws.
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Fourth, at the same time, we should work to rebuild our diminished standing at the UN, which
remains the pre-eminent body for global governance. The UN Charter provides the rule book
for the conduct of international relations and also enables other entities, including the G-20 and
other organizations to work better as well. A strong reputation at the UN as a constructive
power would reinforce our effectiveness in the G-20. The reverse is also true.
Fifth, we should work to promote a reciprocal beneficial relationship between the nascent G-20
and the United Nations. The G-20 can make the UN more effective by importing consensuses
among the major powers, where that is achievable, into UN deliberations. The UN can make
the G-20 more effective by extending the latter’s reach and facilitating cooperation with the
G-172 who are not at the G-20 table but whose cooperation is needed, for example, on
curtailing international crime or terrorism. Both institutions are needed, but neither is sufficient
on its own and cooperation between the two is likely to yield synergies. We could promote
coherence between the two by holding the G-20 summits in New York at the same time as the
UN General Debate each fall, as most leaders attend. That would save wear and tear on leaders
by deleting one major trip and save a vast amount of money, taking advantage of the extensive
security for leaders already afforded by the UN each fall.
Sixth, we should devise strategies for developing and managing effective bilateral and
multilateral relationships with each G-20 country, especially the emerging economies of the
G-20, notably China, India, Brazil, Korea, Turkey and Indonesia. Effective relationships with
these countries would virtually guarantee an effective foreign policy and win us respect in
Washington to boot. The G-20 summits provide a ready-made and very cost-effective
instrument for developing more effective personal relationships with the leaders of arguably the
20 most important countries in the world. 
Seventh, we should create issue-specific alliances in the G-20, beyond the more familiar
relationships among the old G-8. The like-minded groupings of the Cold War have
disintegrated as the EU united, old enemies became partners, other powers emerged and the
nature of international security challenges changed. Further, there is an emerging need for
cooperation and new partnerships among countries that are not themselves great powers by
traditional definition but that nonetheless have both compelling strategic interests in a stable
and prosperous world and the diplomatic capacity and political disposition to make a
significant difference. 
Eighth, as the poorest states are not represented at the G-20, and nor are some of the most
effective smaller countries, notably Norway, the Netherlands, Chile and Singapore, we should
work towards finding a solution to the efficiency (fewer countries around the table) and
inclusivity (all countries around the table) conundrum. Canada could make itself the champion
of the importance of the G-20’s taking into account—genuinely and effectively—the views of
the 172 countries that are not members of the G-20. It is a role that our diplomatic traditions
and residual competencies position us to play superbly.  
Ninth, we should reinvest in diplomacy as the Americans, for example, are doing to prepare for
a world where international diplomacy will be every country’s first line of national security.
Tenth, we should develop a network of Canadian think tanks and universities to reinforce the
expertise available inside the public service, researching these issues and conducting track II
diplomacy to develop informal international consensuses on issues that governments might not
be able to achieve directly. 
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IMF/EB G20 G8 G5 UNSC
 Argentina  Argentina
 Australia  Australia
Belgium
 Brazil  Brazil  Brazil  Brazil
Bosnia
 Canada  Canada  Canada
 China  China  China  China
Colombia
Denmark
Egypt
 European Union  European Union
 France  France  France  France
Gabon
 Germany  Germany  Germany  Germany
 India  India  India  India
 Indonesia
Iran
 Italy  Italy  Italy  
 Japan  Japan  Japan
Lebanon
Lesotho
 Mexico  Mexico  Mexico
Netherlands
Nigeria
Portugal
 Russia  Russia  Russia  Russia
 Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia
 South Africa  South Africa  South Africa
 South Korea
Spain * De facto Member
Switzerland
Thailand
Togo
 Turkey
 United Kingdom  United Kingdom  United Kingdom  United Kingdom
 United States  United States  United States  United States  
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